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Use of the Declaration of Independence as a Military
Recruitment Tool During the American Revolution
Marvin L. Simner
The Declaration of Independence, viewed by thousands each year, is one of the most revered
documents in American history. Housed in a hermetically sealed glass enclosed frame located
in the National Archives, it contains principles “both universal and eternal,” that are said to
form the bedrock for American democracy.1 The first celebration of its importance took place in
Philadelphia on July 8, 1776, while the final celebration that year occurred in Georgia during the month
of August. Between these two periods massive celebrations, as recorded in 1906 by John H. Hazelton, 2
were held in communities across the country when the Declaration was read to the assembled crowds.
Because the goal of the Declaration, as expressed in its title, was largely aspirational and not realized
until end of the war, it was reasonable for Maier3 to ask “what exactly were they celebrating”? In
answer, she wrote “The news, not the vehicle that brought it; independence and the assumption of selfgovernment, not the document that announced Congress’s decision to break with Britain.” Similarly,
Travers4 claimed that during the war years
It gave Revolutionary Americans an opportunity to identify themselves as a group publicly, to
“educate” the uncommitted, and isolate enemies. For the faithful it fueled enthusiasm for a
“new system” and rededicated them to a cause not yet won.
Although it is quite possible that both of these political accounts are correct, it is equally possible that
the Declaration could have had a more pedestrian purpose. According to Maier 5 “By raising the spirit of
the people, the Declaration might also encourage men to join the army and so help American affairs
‘take a more favorable turn’, as John Hancock and the Congress hoped.”
In keeping with Maier’s suggestion, it is important to note that most of the grievances in the Declaration
began with the words ”He has refused” or “He has forbidden.” Thus, it could be, as others6 have
written, that by personalizing the enemy in this fashion, the colonists’ longstanding anger with respect
to taxation, the housing of British troops in private homes, etc. would now focus solely on the King as
the ultimate doer of harm. Indeed, as soon as the news arrived and the Declaration was read to

the assembled crowds the celebrations that took place throughout the colonies, as
documented by Hazelton, clearly testified to the hatred along with the patriotic fervour that
these grievances evoked.
_____________________________________________________________________________
A slightly modified version of this material will appear in the Journal of the American
Revolution.
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On July 9 in New York City
The troops under Washington’s command were told that “The General hopes this
important Event will serve as a free incentive to every officer, and soldier, to act with
Fidelity and Courage, as knowing that now the peace and safety of his Country depends
(under God) solely on the success of our arms.” That same evening “an equestrian
statue of George III …was, by the sons of freedom, laid prostrate in the dirt (and)…the
lead within…was made into bullets, to assimilate with the brains of our infatuated
adversaries…”
On July 16 in Watertown, Massachusetts
The old Gentlemen, Grandfathers to the age of seventy years old, and upwards had
met…and formed themselves into an independent company…and unanimously made
choice of Elias Pelletreau Esq for their leader who made a very animating speech to
them on the necessity of holding themselves in readiness to go into the field in time of
invasion; they cheerfully agreed to it, and determined, at the risk of their lives to defend
the Free and Independent States of America.
On July 22 in Huntington, Long Island
A flag “having Liberty on one side, and George III on the other, underwent a reform, i.e.,
the Union was cut off and the letters GEORGE III were discarded, being publicly ripped
off; and then the effigy of the Personage, represented by those letters, being lately
fabricated out of base materials, its head adorned with a wooden crown stuck full of
feathers…was hung on a gallows, exploded and burnt to ashes.”
On August 7 in Bridgetown, New Jersey
The Chairman of Inspection for the County of Cumberland made a speech that
contained the following fiery message. “In our present situation, engaged in a bloody
and dangerous war with the power of Great Britain for the defence of our lives, our
liberties, our property and everything that is dear and valuable, every member of this
State who enjoys the benefits of its civil government is absolutely bound by the
immutable law of self-preservation, the laws of God and society to assist in protecting
and defending it…As it is impossible for any one possessed of the spirit of a man, who is
a friend to the United States, and whose conscience does not furnish him with an excuse
to stand by, an idle spectator, while his country is struggling and bleeding in her own
necessary defence, all such inactive persons ought therefore to be shunned as enemies
or despised as cowards…and while we rejoice in being formally emancipated from our
haughty and imperious task-masters, let us remember that the final termination of this
grand event is not likely to be brought about without shedding the blood of many of our
dear friends and countrymen.”
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On August 10 in Savanah, Georgia
During the evening the town staged a solemn funeral procession attended by light
infantry companies and the militia. “With drums muffled and a greater number of
people than had appeared on any occasion before in this province, George the Third
was interred before the court-house… Forasmuch as George the Third, of Great Britain,
hath most flagrantly violated his coronation oath and trampled upon the constitution of
our country, and the sacred rights of mankind, we therefore commit his political
existence to the ground, corruption to corruption, tyranny to the grave, and oppression
to eternal infamy; in sure and certain hope that he will never obtain a resurrection to
rule again over these United States of America…”
These examples, along with many others reported by Hazelton, serve to illustrate that the
material in the Declaration clearly generated thoughts of hatred toward the Crown along with
the need for patriotic fidelity. At issue though is whether such thoughts were sufficiently
robust to cause voluntary enlistments in the Continental Army. To address this issue first we
reviewed the forces that led to the emergence of the Continental Army. Next we asked if the
Declaration helped in the army recruiting process.
The rise of the Continental Army
As the Massachusetts colonial militia pursued the retreating British following the battle of
Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, riders were dispatched throughout the colonies to
enlist the aid of additional men to assist in what has become known as the siege of Boston.
Paul Revere, who was one of the riders, traveled widely throughout New England between April
21 and May 7 while others reached such destinations as Philadelphia on April 24, Baltimore on
April 26, and as far south as Charleston on May 9.7
On May 3 the president of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, Joseph Warren, sent an
urgent appeal to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia for military assistance. One month
later Congress received a further request from Warren in which he asked Congress to take full
responsibility for the execution and overall operation of a proposed army.
As the Army now collecting from different colonies is for the general defence of the
right of America, we would beg leave to suggest to your consideration the propriety of
your taking the regulation and general direction of it, that the operations may more
effectually answer the purposes designed.8
On June 3, and in keeping with Warren’s request, Congress’ first action was to take charge of
the Massachusetts militia units as the basis for a Continental Army and to appoint a committee
for the “purpose of borrowing the sum of six thousand pounds for…the purchase of gunpower
for the use of the Continental Army.”9 Next, Congress began the process of laying the
groundwork for such an army by approving its size along with a monthly pay scale.
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…six companies of expert riflemen, immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two in
Maryland, and two in Virginia; that each company consist of a captain, three
lieutenants, four serjeants, four corporals, a drummer or trumpeter, and sixty-eight
privates….$20 for each captain, $13 1/3 dollars for each lieutenant, $8 for each serjeant,
$7 1/3 for each corporal, drummer or trumpeter, and $6 2/3 for each private who were
to find their own arms and cloaths.10
Owing to a widespread fear among the colonists against the existence of a standing army,
enlistments in this newly constituted Continental Army were for one year only, “unless sooner
discharged…” Then on June 15 Congress unanimously elected George Washington to serve as
General in command of the Army and two days later it further resolved to appoint the
remaining officers in the chain of command.11 Finally, on June 20 Washington was told to
“repair with all expedition to the colony of Massachusetts bay to take charge of the army of the
united colonies…” and received a set of instructions on how to proceed with the task of actually
raising the required army.12 In essence, Washington’s main purpose in being sent to Boston
was to take command of what was said to have been a series of well armed, well trained militia
units from which a robust Continental Army could be formed. He was also told that the final
force he needed to assemble should not exceed 22,000 men13 and that its overall cost, if
possible, should not exceed $500,000.14
On July 3, however, he described the army of which he was now in charge as consisting of little
more than “a mixed multitude of people…under very little discipline, order or government.”15
To rectify this situation he subsequently held “conferences with a Congressional committee”
that visited the camp in September 1775. The plan for a proper army that emerged from these
conferences was to consist of
26 regiments of infantry of 728 men each, plus one regiment of riflemen and one of
artillery, 20,372 men in all, to be uniformly paid, supplied, and administered by the
Continental Congress and enlisted to the end of the 1776… 16
Although Washington had requested a force of over 20,000 men, the majority already in the
army resigned as soon as their one-year terms of enlistment were over.17 In fact, by December
1775, fewer than 4,000 of those who had initially volunteered for service remained,18 and when
taken together with those in service on January 1, 1776, Washington “had exactly 5,582 men to
man a ring of forts and batteries in the sprawling semicircle that ran from Prospect Hill through
the town of Cambridge to Roxbury – some eight miles.”19 By early March 1776 “only a
thousand or so more” had voluntarily agreed to serve the needs of the country and joined the
Continental Army.20
Did the Declaration help in recruiting?
Although there are no data that bear directly on this question, a tentative answer can be found
in recommendations from the Board of War. In view of the extremely troubling circumstances
that Washington had encountered, coupled with a still worsening military situation, on
4

September 16, 1776, which was only one month after the final celebrations of the Declaration
were held, Congress received for its consideration several recommendations from the Board
both of which stemmed from Washington’s long held beliefs.21 First, an effective army will
result only if its members are recruited for periods that extend well beyond the current one
year term of enlistment and, second, enlistment bonuses are essential to achieve the desired
numbers of recruits. With these recommendations in mind Congress approved the following:
That eighty eight battalions be enlisted as soon as possible, to serve during the present
war, and that each state furnish their respective quotas in the following proportions:
Delaware 1 battalion, Rhode Island 2 battalions….Virginia and Massachusetts bay 15
battalions each (and) that twenty dollars be given as bounty to each non-commissioned
officer and private soldier, who shall enlist to serve during the present war, unless
sooner discharged by Congress.22
To further encourage enlistments, Congress also approved an additional bonus that consisted
of the granting of land “to the officers and soldiers who shall so engage in the service, and
continue therein to the close of the war, or until discharged by Congress and to the
representatives of such officers and soldiers as shall be slain by the enemy.” The grants ranged
in size from 100 acres for non-commissioned officers and soldiers to 500 acres for a Colonel.23
Clearly, if hatred of the crown and patriotic fervour engendered by the Declaration were
sufficient justifications to induce enlistments there should have been no need for the Board to
request, and for Congress to approve, both land grants and $20 bonuses as added enlistment
incentives. As a result of his own experiences in the French and Indian War, Washington was
well aware that this would be the case since he had concluded that “the average man thought
in terms of his own self-interest as long as total disaster did not seem imminent.” In line with
this point, and more recently, Washington reported that a number of his officers had defected
to the British in order to obtain the pardons that had been offered by General Howe on
November 30, 1776, and few of the troops under Generals Sullivan and Gates “showed any
willingness to reenlist for service after the expiration of their terms…”24 Possibly in anticipation
of such defections on October 21, 1776, Congress had approved the following oath that “every officer
who holds or shall hereafter hold, a commission or office from Congress, shall subscribe (to)…”
I do acknowledge the Thirteen United States of America, namely, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts Bay, etc. to be free, independent, and sovereign states, and declare, that the
people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience to George the third, king of Great Britain; and
(that) I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him…So help me God. 25

Also worth mentioning are Washington’s further experiences in mid-August, 1776. Two British
ships, the Phoenix and Rose, were sighted sailing up the Hudson and were suspected of
attempting to establish contact between Howe and Burgoyne. Although Washington had
hoped that the words in the Declaration would serve as an “incentive to every officer and
soldier to act with Fidelity and Courage,” apparently this did not happen. When the troops
5

under his command were ordered to halt the passage of both ships, they had failed to obey his
order. As revealed in the following summary of this episode, the patriotic zeal displayed so
eagerly only one month earlier was now totally absent.
One serious aspect of this affair was the misbehavior of many of the American soldiers,
who, at the sounding of the alarm, should have hurried to their posts. They did almost
everything except that. Not more than half the artillerists even went to the guns.
Hundreds of the troops appeared to forget their duty in watching the race of the ships
up the stream. Several men were killed and two or three were wounded because they
carelessly failed to sponge their guns. Some of their comrades attributed this to
drunkenness; the absence of still others was due, in the language of one disgusted
diarist, to the fact that they “were at this cups or whoring.” That, surely, was not the
disciplinary standard necessary in service of the sort that manifestly lay ahead. ”Such
unsoldierly conduct,” Washington said the next day in General Orders, “must grieve
every good officer, and give the enemy a mean opinion of the Army…” 26
Conclusion
While there was tremendous excitement and enthusiasm for the impending revolution when the words
in the Declaration were initially read to the assembled crowds in July/August 1776, the most that can

be said about their subsequent impact is that they had either a negligible, or at best, only a
limited effect on encouraging military enlistments and on maintaining military fidelity. Martin
and Lender27 were equally explicit in their evaluation of this matter when they stated that “the
inclusion of bounty provisions in the recruiting laws was an admission that appeals to virtue had
not spurred enough enlistments,” and so too was Royster based on his review of the October
16, 1775, correspondence between Nathanael Green and Samuel Ward. He concluded that
“Men were not obliged to resort to the Army for employment and were not inclined to enlist
altruistically.”28 Finally, and in the words of Freeman, it is worth noting that not only did
the American Army continued to dwindle in a manner to make a stout heart stop

beating,…at the end of November (1776), exhortation, oratory and the tender of the
bounty had weighted not at all against fear and cold, homesickness and the professed
belief that the other man ought to now do his part…29
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